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Juggling Between Open Science and the Market:
Public Science Responses to the Patentability of
Biomedical Research Tools
Abstract
The aim of this study is to give an overview of the institutional realign-
ments in the biomedical research sector brought about by changes in the in-
tellectual property (IP) regime that enabled the expansion of patent protec-
tion to new areas, such as living organisms and basic biological information,
and new actors, such as universities and public research institutes. These
changes created two risks: a weaker dissemination of knowledge due to high
access costs to research tools and findings, and the disruption of the norms of
openness, traditionally associated with scientific progress. The present study
elaborates a typology of public scientists’ IP responses with respect to re-
search tools and traces the main factors behind them on the basis of personal
interviews and documentary analysis. The co-existence of different and often
conflicting IP responses shows that public researchers operate in a hybrid in-
stitutional system, which forces them to juggle constantly between the rules
of the market and the conventions of »open science«. Although they are often
able to do so relatively smoothly, some responses clearly point at problems in
the patent regime. Moreover, they are indicative of some major changes in
the research system, where new IP practices and growing science and technology
interaction profoundly affect science funding policies, firm creation propen-
sity and the organization of R&D across the public and the private sphere.
INTRODUCTION
This paper sets out to understand the responses of the academiccommunity to changes in the intellectual property regime that en-
abled the expansion of patent protection to new areas, such as living or-
ganisms and basic biological information, and to new actors, such as
universities and public research institutes. I focus mostly on organiza-
tions in the US for a pragmatic reason: this country was at the forefront
of scientific and technological advances in biomedicine and biotech-
nology, as well as the forerunner of changes in regulations that are rele-
vant for the problem that I am analyzing. The paper is based on pri-
mary sources such as personal interviews with the representatives of the
public research sector and written accounts of major developments in
biotechnology, as well as on a variety of secondary sources.
The IP changes analyzed in this paper spurred a massive increase in
patents on research results that are considerably distant from down-
stream products. This has especially been the case in biomedicine,
which has witnessed a proliferation of patents on inventions that could
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Science policy
be defined as »research tools«. According to the main
powerhouse of biomedical research in the US, the Na-
tional Institutes of Health (NIH), research tools include
inputs such as cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, rea-
gents, animal models, growth factors, clones and cloning
tools, methods, laboratory equipment and machines, da-
tabases and computer software (1). They are therefore
tangible or informational inputs whose primary useful-
ness is as tools for research and for the discovery of drugs,
diagnostics and other medical applications, rather than
as products themselves. Research tools became the flash-
point of heated and still largely unresolved IP debates.
The reactions of the biomedical research community to
the patentability of research tools have been varied. The
diversity of IP responses reflects the different incentives,
pressures and events to which biomedical research actors
have been exposed.
THE CHANGING IP REGIME AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS
Legal changes that enabled an upsurge of patents on
biomedical research tools can be traced to a combination
of factors, ranging from the dynamics of science and
technology co-evolution in the field of molecular biology
to a general ideological change – first occurring in the US
– in attitudes towards patents and towards the idea of
commercialization of public research (2, 3).
The phenomenon of growing convergence and inter-
dependence between science and technology in molecu-
lar biology started in the late 1970s, after Stanley Cohen’s
and Herbert Boyer’s discovery of a method for manipu-
lating the genetic characteristics of a cell in order to in-
duce it to produce a specific protein such as a human
hormone. This discovery marked the beginning of a
widespread use of the techniques of genetic engineering,
which enabled the rise of the biotechnology industry and
caused profound changes in the way in which pharma-
ceutical R&D was organized. A shift occurred from an in-
ternalized and relatively self-sufficient model of research
organization within large pharmaceutical firms towards
a more networked model of innovation, marked by a
stronger interaction between established firms, small
biotechnology firms close to public science and public re-
search organizations (PROs).
The new opportunities and organizational arrange-
ments brought about by biotechnology led to a growing
tension between two contrasting ambitions of the major
knowledge-producing actors: the rapid disclosure and
sharing of research results, typical of public science norms,
and the appropriation of knowledge by commercial firms.
The drive toward appropriation has especially been strong
for biotech firms, whose business models depended hea-
vily on IP. Most biotech firms are in fact essentially re-
search entities with few products on the market. They
have therefore relied on venture capital as a source of
funding, and patents are major assets to attract venture
capital (4, 5).
With rapid advancements in genomic technologies, a
fierce competition between two opposing views on the
desirability of patenting DNA and genetic data and tech-
niques began. This clash occurred in the context of a
pro-patenting trend in US research policy, which started
in the late 1970s and which facilitated the passage of the
Bayh-Dole Act in 1980. The Act enabled universities to
apply for patents on the results of federally funded re-
search and to grant exclusive and non-exclusive licenses
to other parties. A related law passed in the same year was
the Stevenson Wydler Act, which charged government
owned research laboratories, like those of the NIH, with
the responsibility of using the patent system to promote
the commercialization of inventions. The rationale be-
hind these two acts was that IP protection would facili-
tate the commercialization of the results of federally fi-
nanced research.
Another legal landmark in the biomedical IP arena in
1980 was the US Supreme Court Diamond vs. Chaka-
barty decision on the patentability of a genetically modi-
fied bacterium. After this ruling, inventions involving
life forms were considered patentable in the US. In the
following years, many European countries modified their
IP legislations in order to emulate the US approach.
Other important changes in IP policy in the last few de-
cades include the expansion of the scope of patent pro-
tection to areas such as software, algorithms and infor-
mation on biological materials; a relaxation of the paten-
tability criteria of novelty, utility and non-obviousness;
and a broader protection conferred by patents, including
protection for a wide range of applications unknown at
the time of patenting, such as still unidentified functions
of genes and DNA sequences (6, 7).
It also became more difficult for scientists, especially
in the US, to rely on exemption for research use of pat-
ented inventions. Thus, in the 2002 Madey v. Duke case,
the Court of Appeal of the Federal Circuit in the US held
that research exemptions should be granted only when
research is for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for
strict philosophical inquiry. According to the Court’s
ruling, doing basic or applied research was part of the
central business of a university and could not qualify for
research exemption (3).
Two interrelated theoretical concerns have been rai-
sed in the innovation literature with respect to these IP
changes. The first one is that increasing patenting could
negatively affect research and innovation by limiting the
accessibility of knowledge and by creating high transac-
tion costs (8). The second major concern, which can be
traced to Robert Merton’s (9) analysis of the science sys-
tem as an institution, is that the private appropriation of
scientific knowledge could erode the norms of »open sci-
ence«, thus threatening the very prerequisites of effective
knowledge production (10).
According to some analysts, the public and the private
research communities, although complementary, are very
different and should be kept separated (11). The private
sector is geared toward maximizing rents from knowl-
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edge and is governed by economic institutions like IP
rights, while the public research community is aimed at
maximizing the total stock of available knowledge by
rapidly disclosing and sharing new knowledge, and is
regulated by »open science« norms. The institutional
marriage between the two communities and the escala-
tion of academic patenting creates risks such as publica-
tion delays, secrecy and withholding of data and mate-
rials (12); the shifting of the orientation of university
research away from basic towards applied research (13);
and the »locking up« of a substantial amount of biomedi-
cal knowledge in patents (4). This is particularly prob-
lematic when this knowledge represents the necessary
building blocks or research tools for other inventions.
The goal of this study is to examine how pressures re-
lated to patents on research tools are being resolved by
different actors in the public research system.
OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC RESEARCH
RESPONSES WITH RESPECT TO
RESEARCH TOOLS
The responses of the public research community to
the newly arisen IP situation in biotechnology have been
very heterogeneous. Depending on how close they are to
»open science« or to market institutions, they can be
grouped into four categories. The first one comprises a
set of »roll-back« IP responses that oppose or challenge
the patent system. The second category of responses
could be called »informal adaptation« and primarily it
implies a disregard of patents and IP incentives in gen-
eral. The third category comprises several »hybrid re-
sponses« that attempt to find a compromise, or even a
win-win solution, between IP and »open science« insti-
tutions. Finally, the last category of IP strategies used by
public researchers could be called »market acceptance«.
It involves the support of the patent system and the pur-
suit of an aggressive patenting and licensing policy.
Roll-back responses
Categorical opposition to patents is nowadays a rare
IP response in the public biomedical sector, especially in
the US. The public and the private sector have become so
intertwined that categorically contesting patents on re-
search tools and other upstream inventions would be
contrary to the policy and funding models of universities
and other PROs. An area where some organized at-
tempts to mobilize opposition to patents appeared was
genetic testing, although this opposition came primarily
from the medical profession rather than the scientific
community. There are more than 1,000 genetic diseases
that can be diagnosed through available tests and most of
the genes associated with these diseases are not free of
patents (14). In the late 1990s a number of professional
societies of doctors and clinical geneticists were outspo-
ken critics of these disease gene patents, especially if sub-
jected to exclusive licensing to perform diagnostic tests.
They claimed that patent-based restrictions on who may
perform genetic tests increase the cost of genetic tests and
prevent the identification and validation of new muta-
tions by other laboratories, thus interfering with the prac-
tice of medicine.
Most actors nowadays think that correcting the patent
system in some domains where it has »gone wrong« is a
more feasible option than opposing patents on genes and
other naturally occurring substances altogether. One of
the ways in which PROs can try to do that is by challeng-
ing patents. Once a patent is granted, there are two ways
to attack it: by asking the court to declare the patent in-
valid in a lawsuit or by petitioning the USPTO, the EPO
or the other relevant patent authority to re-examine the pat-
ent. Both lawsuits and patent re-examinations have serious
drawbacks as strategies to challenge the patent system.
One of the most discussed recent challenges of re-
search tools patents was the challenge of the University
of Wisconsin Research Foundation (WARF)’s embry-
onic stem cell patents led by the California-based Foun-
dation for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights and the Public
Patent Foundation. This case illustrated well the prob-
lems associated with challenging patents, such as the
limited maneuvering space that challengers have when
attacking a patent, as well as the fact that the final deci-
sion in a re-examination proceeding is made by the pat-
ent office, which tends to favor patent holders. Thus, de-
spite a preliminary denial of claims contained in the
human embryonic stem cell patents, after an appeal from
WARF the USPTO upheld the patents. Another prob-
lem of patent re-examination proceedings is that they
can, paradoxically, reinforce the positions of patent holders.
If a patent stands the re-examination, it is also much more
likely to be successfully defended in a potential lawsuit (15).
The academic community has so far been rarely in-
volved in patent challenges. The interviews on which
this study is based suggest that the main reasons for this
are the legal, administrative and financial difficulties in-
volved in challenging patents, as well as the fact that pat-
ents are still seldom enforced on academics. However,
there are examples of patents on research tools that have
been successfully challenged by the public research com-
munity, such as the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes patents in
Europe in 2001 and 2002. The challenges were led by the
French cancer research center Institut Curie and some
other French and Italian research institutes (14).
A similar challenge has since May 2009 been under-
way in the US. The Association for Molecular Pathology
and other plaintiffs, which among others comprise scien-
tific associations representing approximately 150,000 re-
searchers, filed a lawsuit against the USPTO, Myriad
Genetics and the University of Utah Research Founda-
tion, which holds the patents on the BRCA1 and BRCA2
genes. They asked the court to rule that patents on these
two human genes associated with breast and ovarian
cancer are unconstitutional and invalid, and that those
patents stifle diagnostic testing and research that could
lead to cures by placing restrictions on competition and
blocking alternatives to the patented tests and the prac-
tice of interpreting or comparing gene sequences that in-
volved those genes. The plaintiffs also challenged the
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idea that isolated nucleic acid molecules are patentable
because they are »products of nature«. Surprisingly, this
is the first case in the US that directly considers whether
DNA sequences are patentable subject matter (16, 17).
A more frequent roll-back response of PROs is pre-
-emptive publication. This is the strategy that was used
by the leadership of the Human Genome Project, which
had the policy of releasing genomic information on pub-
licly available databases within 24 hours of their discov-
ery, since the patent law stipulates that an invention can-
not be patented if it has already been disclosed. Large
collaborative projects aimed at identifying genomic data
and immediately placing them on publicly available da-
tabases, in order to prevent their patenting by other ac-
tors, are institutional innovations that not only survived
in the world of academia, but that were also supported
and adopted by several large pharmaceutical companies.
They were the model for projects such as the EST Con-
sortium, the SNP Consortium, the International Hap-
Map project, the Mouse Sequencing Consortium, the
ENCODE project, the International Diabetes Initiative
and the Cancer Genome Atlas project.
A project that perhaps deserves special attention is the
ENCODE project (Encyclopedia of DNA Elements),
because it was at the inception of this project in 2003 that
the NIH and some other major genome research financ-
ing bodies defined more precisely their IP policies to-
wards large-scale genomic projects. ENCODE was en-
visaged by the NIH as »a community resource project« that
required participants, as resource producers, to release
data as soon as they are verified (18). At a Wellcome Trust
sponsored meeting of large-scale DNA sequence produ-
cers and users, community resource projects were defined
as projects »specifically devised and implemented to create a
set of data, reagents or other material whose primary utility will
be as a resource for the broad scientific community« (19).
However, the ENCODE project was also somewhat
different from prior large-scale genome sequencing pro-
jects, since its goal was to identify the functional ele-
ments of a defined portion of the human genome, such as
transcription factors binding sites, which is information
that could certainly have »utility« in the patent law sense
of the term. This was explicitly recognized in the main
ENCODE policy document, but so was the need to re-
frain from patenting even in the case of data that satisfy
the patent utility criteria but are still very upstream in the
research process. These data are considered pre-compet-
itive, in the sense that a considerable amount of work
would need to be done beyond the initial data production
to demonstrate utility (18).
The pre-competitiveness argument has also been en-
dorsed by many pharmaceutical firms, which not only
verbally supported, but also financed the production and
the placing in the public domain of sequencing and
other genomic data. The first company to do that was
Merck, which in 1995 began to fund gene sequencing at
the Washington University in St. Luis. The project was
initiated in a period when biotech companies such as
Incyte and Human Genome Sciences were already in-
tensively patenting ESTs. More than ten years after this
move of Merck, the idea of keeping pre-competitive ge-
nomic data in the public domain is still popular among
pharmaceutical companies. For instance, in 2006 No-
vartis released online all its sequencing data on Type 2
Diabetes produced in collaboration with three PROs. In
the same year, another pharmaceutical giant, Pfizer, in
cooperation with the NIH, launched the Genetic Associ-
ation Information Network, a project aimed at unravel-
ing the genetic causes of several common diseases and
making the information publicly available.
Informal adaptation
Regardless the above examples of active resistance to
patents, public scientists have mostly been reactive in re-
lation to the developments in the IP regime that allowed
patents on upstream research inputs such as genes. »Bu-
siness as usual« is therefore a common IP response that
actually implies the disregard of the patents system. For
instance, in a survey conducted in the US on a sample of
1688 biomedical researchers, Walsh, Cho and Cohen
(20) found that only 5 percent of researchers check regu-
larly for patents on research inputs. Factors that facilitate
the disregard of patents include the difficulty in perceiv-
ing infringement and the low likelihood that firms will
sue PROs, especially if products are still far away from
the market. Infringement suits against universities are
bad publicity for firms. They are usually also bad busi-
ness decisions, since by tolerating infringement firms get
free research on their technology, and if the researcher
comes up with something valuable that uses their pat-
ented technology, whoever wants to commercialize it will
have to go back to the original patent holder (21).
How sustainable is this disregard of patents? As PROs
– under a growing pressure to find additional funding
sources – become increasingly aggressive patent holders,
public scientists also become more vulnerable to patent
infringement claims, as the 2001 Madey v. Duke Univer-
sity case showed (3). In academia, in fact, ignoring pat-
ents held by others sometimes goes hand in hand with
the patenting of one’s own research results or at least
with a strategy that could be called »patenting by de-
fault«, which consists of the submission on the part of
principal investigators of short invention disclosure forms
to the technology transfer officers, which then make pat-
enting decisions (22).
Hybrid responses
When the rapid advances in biotechnology and the re-
lated developments in patent law and practice gave way
to an upsurge of patents on inventions that were consid-
ered basic scientific discoveries by some, and appropria-
ble technological inventions by others, the need to set a
new boundary between the scientific commons and pro-
prietary technology appeared. Research policy organiza-
tions such as the NIH played a leading role in such an
endeavor and introduced the concept of »research tools«.
As part of this strategy, since 1998 the NIH has been
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warning its researchers and grantees that in cases where
the patented invention is primarily a research tool, exclu-
sive licensing practices are likely to thwart rather than
promote the utilization, commercialization and public
availability of inventions (1, 23).
In advocating its IP policies towards research tools,
the NIH took a pragmatic stance. The criteria chosen for
drawing a line between common and appropriable in-
ventions in the NIH policies had not so much to do with
the science-technology divide or with ethical consider-
ations. Instead, they were based on the calculations re-
lated to the trade-off between the need to have certain
classes of genomic technologies widely available and the
necessity of granting incentives in the form of exclusive
rights for firms to realize the diagnostic and therapeutic
uses of genomic advances. Thus, the first key document
that was produced by the NIH in this respect, the »NIH
Principles and Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Re-
search Grants and Contracts on Obtaining and Dissemi-
nating Biomedical Research Resources: Final Notice«
(23) states that patenting should be avoided or appro-
ached with caution if:
»1) the primary usefulness of the resource is as a tool for
discovery rather than an FDA-approved product or integral
component of such a product;
2) the resource is a broad, enabling invention that will be
useful to many scientists (or multiple companies in develop-
ing multiple products), rather than a project or product-spe-
cific resource; and
3) the resource is readily useable or distributable as a tool
rather than the situation where private sector involvement is
necessary or the most expedient means for developing or dis-
tributing the resource.«
From this document, as well as from other documents
on the same subject produced by the NIH, it appears that
some broad criteria discouraging patenting have slowly
emerged. They include the generic potential of an inven-
tion, i.e. the commonness by which it can be used either
as a collection of »pre-competitive information« (18) or
as a research tool (e.g. a cell line or a mouse model), and
little need of further private investment in realizing the
primary use of an invention. Of course, applying these
criteria is often challenging, especially in cases of novel
technologies the uses of which is difficult to anticipate.
Open-source biology could also be considered a hy-
brid IP response in the sense that it tries to find some bal-
ance between the IP law and the scientific and techno-
logical commons. Open-source biology takes inspiration
from open-source approaches in the software industry
and the idea is to implement an open system of licensing
that does not require payment, but instead requires that
any innovation made by using the open-source invention
be placed in the public domain. Agricultural biotechnol-
ogy contains a couple of examples of projects pushing for
open source both as a development methodology and as a
licensing scheme. For instance, the PIPRA initiative (Pub-
lic Intellectual Property for Research in Agriculture) was
launched in 2003 by a number of PROs in the US, in or-
der to overcome the fragmentation of IP ownership in
agricultural biotechnology. In biomedical biotechnology,
synthetic biology is a field that has witnessed initiatives
towards open source, such as the Registry of Standard Bi-
ological Parts. However, the interviews upon which this
paper is based have shown that translating the open sour-
ce paradigm from software to biology has been problematic
for a number of reasons, such as the low level at which
biotechnology has been modularized, the higher capital
costs and longer development times necessary for devel-
oping biotech products, as well as the challenges of trans-
lating open source licenses from copyright to patent law.
Publicly-minded patenting and licensing is another
strategy pursued by PROs that accepts the permeable
boundary between »open science« and the market, but
also tries to ensure high knowledge dissemination through
selective patenting and licensing and through various
safeguards. The emergence of publicly-minded IP strate-
gies was the result of a gradual learning process whereby
the academic community slowly learned to take up the
best elements of the patent system while minimizing its
downsides (21).
In 2006 twelve top US research universities gathered
to brainstorm about important societal, policy and legal
issues in university technology transfer. They produced a
White Paper entitled »In the Public Interest: Nine Points
to Consider in Licensing University Technology«, which
was later endorsed by the Association of University Tech-
nology Managers and disseminated to other universities
in the US. The so-called »Nine Points Memo« (24) rec-
ognizes that when crafting agreements with industry, a
balance must be struck between the business needs of the
private licensing partners and the shared values of uni-
versities. The document emphasizes the following nine
principles that must be addressed when patenting and li-
censing university-produced inventions:
1. Universities should reserve the right to practice licensed
inventions, and to allow other non-profit and govern-
mental organizations to do so;
2. Exclusive licenses should be structured in a manner that
encourages technology development and use;
3. Strive to minimize the licensing of »future improvements;«
4. Universities should anticipate and help to manage tech-
nology transfer related conflicts of interest;
5. Ensure broad access to research tools;
6. Enforcement action should be carefully considered;
7. Be mindful of export regulations;
8. Be mindful of the implications of working with patent
aggregators; and
9. Consider including provisions that address unmet needs,
such as those of neglected patient populations or geo-
graphic areas, giving particular attention to improved
therapeutics, diagnostics, and agricultural technologies
for the developing world.
According to some of the interviewees in this study, a
smart patenting and licensing strategy does not only
serve the public interest by stimulating technology trans-
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fer, but it can also perform two other functions that are in
the interest of the public. Firstly, it can channel private
funding into the research activities of increasingly cash-
-constrained PROs through industrial partnerships and
licensing revenues. Secondly, a strong patent on a foun-
dational technology controlled by a PRO can prevent the
patenting of some slightly different follow-up invention
by a private firm and thus the potential imposition of
high access costs of a technology that is still upstream and
enabling. The second point, however, necessitates fur-
ther examination.
The first example of such a patent is the foundational
biotechnology patent on the gene splicing technique, the
so-called Cohen-Boyer patent. The patent was filed by
Stanford University in November 1974 and jointly awar-
ded in 1980 to Stanford and the University of California
of San Francisco. The patent covered a common tool – a
technique that was critical for the whole of molecular bi-
ology – but that was neither expensive nor difficult to dis-
seminate without private involvement. The IP strategy
that was chosen by the two universities was to allow the
public sector to use the technology for free, while charg-
ing some relatively modest royalties to companies. The
patent generated millions of revenues for the universities
and is considered one of the most successful patents ever.
Nevertheless, many people still frown upon this patent,
saying that it should have never been awarded because it
covers a basic technique developed in the public sector
that did not necessitate IP protection in order to be dis-
seminated (25).
The important policy question that the above exam-
ples raise is what are the merits of pre-emptively patent-
ing an enabling technology over merely publishing it?
Although many research organizations portray patent-
ing for the purpose of non-exclusive licensing as a pub-
licly-minded practice, the equation between the two is
problematic. According to Joel Kirschbaum (26), co-
-founder and director of University of California at San
Francisco’s technology transfer office, licensees derive lit-
tle benefit from non-exclusive patent licenses. These li-
censes are a tax the companies must pay to obtain the
freedom to operate with a technology that has already
been published or presented publicly. Such licenses do
not provide any strategic value or competitive edge for a
company and thus give them no additional incentive to
commercialize the technology for public use and benefit.
Market acceptance
Finally, the last category of IP responses entails a
strong acceptance of markets for knowledge and the pur-
suit of a broad patenting strategy and a revenue-maxi-
mizing licensing policy. The primary and secondary
data collected for the purpose of this study suggest that
there are several ways in which a PRO can pursue an ag-
gressive IP policy: (i) by unselectively and broadly pat-
enting upstream inventions; (ii) by enforcing patents on
academics; (iii) by aggressively enforcing patents on up-
stream discoveries against firms that produce downstream
products; (iv) by exclusively licensing research tools that
are potentially enabling for a large field and that necessi-
tate the involvement of many research actors; (v) by
artificially prolonging the life of patents on research tools
by means of continuation applications; (vi) by broadly
relinquishing IP rights in exchange for private funding.
As far as the first practice is concerned, for some scien-
tists patenting could be considered a »default strategy«
that takes place through the submission of short inven-
tion disclosure forms to the technology transfer offices,
which then make patenting decisions. The technology
transfer experts interviewed for this study reported that,
if asked, scientists are almost always in favor of filing pat-
ent applications.
The second instance of aggressive IP behavior is the
enforcement of patents on research tools against aca-
demics. One such tool are embryonic stem cell lines
owned by WARF. Another example of a very important
research tool patent that was aggressively enforced against
academics is the Oncomouse patent. The Oncomouse, a
mouse genetically engineered to be susceptible to certain
types of cancer, was developed by Philip Leder at Har-
vard University. The work was sponsored by the DuPont
Corporation, which provided six million dollars to fi-
nance Leder’s research. The quid pro quo was that Du-
Pont would be entitled to an exclusive license on any pat-
ents stemming from this research (14). When DuPont
obtained the license in 1988, it decided to charge aca-
demics a fee for the mouse, placed limits on informal ex-
change of mice between scientists and demanded that
scientists give DuPont the rights to any future invention
made using the Oncomouse (27).
A third instance of aggressive IP behavior with respect
to research tools is the enforcement of patents on up-
stream discoveries against firms that produce downstream
products. For instance, the University of Rochester was
awarded a patent on the gene for the COX-2 enzyme on
the basis of a discovery that stomach irritation associated
with nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs is caused by
the inhibition of a protective enzyme Cox-1 that is dis-
tinct from a similar enzyme Cox-2 that causes inflamma-
tion. The Rochester scientists hypothesized that mole-
cules that selectively inhibit only Cox-2 might provide
relief from pain and inflammation without provoking
gastrointestinal side effects. Although the University of
Rochester did not identify nor test any such molecule,
eight years after its application it obtained a patent on a
method for selectively inhibiting Cox-2 in human hosts.
Before the patent was granted, a pharmaceutical com-
pany, Pfizer, had already developed independently a se-
lective Cox-2 inhibitor and the University of Rochester
sued them for infringement. The suit was, however, un-
successful (14).
The exclusive licensing of research tools that are po-
tentially enabling for a large field and that necessitate the
involvement of many research actors is another instance
of revenue-maximizing IP strategy that pays little heed
to social welfare. An example of this are the patents on
the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes, underlying hereditary
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breast cancer, awarded to Mark Skolnick and the Univer-
sity of Utah, which licensed it exclusively to Myriad Ge-
netics, a biopharmaceutical company founded by Skol-
nick and others. The company imposed high access costs
on the test and requested that all samples be sent to its
own laboratory for analysis, thus building exclusive data-
bases and arguably extending its monopoly beyond what
was granted by patent law (28).
Artificially prolonging the life of patents on research
tools by means of continuation applications is another
strategy that is sometimes pursued by PROs and that is
hardly in the public interest. Among the many examples
of this strategy are the Axel-Wigler patents on the cotrans-
formation process, owned by Columbia University. They
were awarded in 1983 and earned Columbia University
hundreds of million of dollars in revenues until their ex-
piry in 2000. Columbia University filed a continuation
application basically on the same technique and was
awarded another patent in 2002, due to expire only in
2019. However, after a lawsuit with companies that re-
fused to take a license for it and a challenge initiated by
the Public Patent Foundation on the basis of the argu-
ment that the patent violates the restriction against mul-
tiple patenting, Columbia waived any right to assert the
patent in December 2004 (29).
Finally, broadly relinquishing IP rights in exchange
for private funding is another practice that can endanger
the circulation of research tools produced in the public
sector. Universities took advantage of the biotechnology
boom by signing massive research contracts with compa-
nies, in which industry received generous promises of IP
that was at least partially funded by federal sponsors (30).
An early example occurred in 1992, when the Swiss phar-
maceutical company Sandoz offered 300 million dollars
to Scripps Research Institute in San Diego in return for
100 percent of the resulting IP rights. Although later on
the US Congress and the NIH forced Scripps to scale
back both the level of funding and the percentage of IP
rights, the Scripps-Sandoz story did not end up with a
binding policy by the NIH on this issue nor did it dimin-
ish the trend of these deals in general.
MAIN EXPLANATORY FACTORS BEHIND
THE CONTRASTING ATTITUDES
TOWARDS PATENTING IN ACADEMIA
The present section will review the main drivers be-
hind these conflicting responses of researchers to patents
on biomedical research tools. One of the goals of my
study was to explore to what extent patents are compati-
ble with the »open science« ethos in the eyes of the pro-
tagonists of the public biomedical research enterprise.
The gathered evidence in the form of interviews and pri-
mary and secondary accounts suggest that the actors be-
hind roll-back responses were rarely categorically op-
posed to patenting, even in the case of many research
tools. Opposition was rather limited to patents on certain
categories of research tools, the breadth of some patents
and the ways in which the patents’ licensing was han-
dled. The research tools that seemed to have raised
particular concern were raw genomic and proteomic in-
formation whose main value lies in databases and re-
search tools such as cell lines or DNA parts with broad
generic potential and with often unknown development
trajectories. Concerns were particularly accentuated if
negative experiences with access to these or similar re-
search tools had been experienced in the past. The gath-
ered data revealed that the representatives of both the
public research sector and of pharmaceutical firms are
well aware of the importance of having a large toolkit of
research tools promptly available for research and devel-
opment purposes. However, the incentive to maintain
this toolkit as free as possible from transaction costs im-
posed by patents and licenses is balanced constantly with
the incentives provided by patents, especially the incen-
tive to accrue additional research funds through licens-
ing income or private funding.
More common than active resistance is passive resis-
tance to patents. Academics often simply ignore patents
and the explanations for that include the limited amount
of time that scientists have at their disposal for consider-
ing patenting issues, the convenience of sticking to some
old habits when it comes to the use and exchange of research
materials, the low likelihood that infringement will be
noticed at the research stage and the low risk of academ-
ics being sued for research use of patented inventions.
The incentives to apply for and grant patents are very
strong both at the level of individual scientists and at the
level of their organizations. At the individual level, pat-
enting can secure researchers unimpeded access to re-
search tools, prestige and financial gain. It can facilitate
their scientific lead and secure private research funds
through licensing revenues or industrial cooperation and
it can also enable them to establish new firms built
around exclusive IP rights. These potential benefits that
can arise from patents must also be considered in light of
the relatively small effort that scientists themselves have
to put into writing and handling patent applications (this
is primarily the task of technology transfer specialists at
universities and of patent attorneys who are paid by the
universities) and the fact that the costs of application and
maintenance fees are not covered by individual inventors
but by their organizations.
At the organizational level, the support for patenting
can primarily be explained as an attempt to bring in addi-
tional research funds by means of licensing revenues. For
some universities in the US licensing has been an impor-
tant source of income, although in general revenues from
government-sponsored research have outweighed patent
revenues by an order of magnitude (31). The defensive
motive also plays a role. By securing patents on founda-
tional technologies, universities and other PROs can save
themselves a lot of trouble and money that they would
potentially have to invest in obtaining licenses from other
PROs and firms.
A group that has strong incentives to push for more
patents and that is often overlooked when studying aca-
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demic patenting are patent attorneys. According to Dan-
iel Ravicher (32), the Executive Director of the Public
Patent Foundation, patent attorneys have developed
strong relationships with technology transfer officers and
academics and they exert a significant influence on them.
Much of the IP discourse is led by patent attorneys,
whose interests may not coincide with the interests of sci-
entists and businesspeople in the biotech industry whom
they represent. Patent attorneys, argues Ravicher (32),
have a personal interest in bloating the patent system up
so that there is more demand for their services.
The above factors have created a situation in which
the biomedical research sector, both public and private, is
geared towards producing more upstream and far-reach-
ing patents (32). This is reinforced by the high degree of
unpredictability in the patent system that makes it diffi-
cult to estimate which patents can be enforced and which
not, and whether the freedom to operate in certain re-
search fields can be effectively defended by means other
than patents. Some actors reply to this uncertainty by try-
ing to play safe and apply for the broadest possible pro-
tection and for multiple patents covering different as-
pects of their invention. The patent system becomes thus
clogged with overarching patent claims that have poten-
tially stifling effects on innovation.
In 2007 the USPTO attempted to pass new rules lim-
iting the number of claims per patent and the number of
continuation applications for single inventions. These
rules, however, met with resistance from the biotech and
the pharmaceutical industry, as well as from some repre-
sentatives of the public sector and were withdrawn (33).
The same holds true for the Patent Reform Act discussed
in Congress in 2007, 2008 and then again, in a somewhat
watered down version, in 2009 and 2010. Biotech lobby
groups have been strongly opposing the Act. According
to the Biotechnology Industry Associations (34), the pro-
posed changes were aimed to limit the reach of patents
on upstream inventions and undermine the strength,
value and predictability of patent protection. The Bio-
technology Industry Organization and other biotech lob-
by associations fiercely opposed the Patent Reform Act by
testifying in front of Congress and claiming that these
changes would devastate life sciences business models.
The university technology transfer community weighted
in with similar concerns (35).
Although the view conveyed in the University of Cali-
fornia brief entitled »Patent reform legislation – Analysis
of S.1145, the ‘Patent Reform Act of 2007’ – Provisions of
Concern to UC« (36) may not be representative of the
whole US public research sector, several things about this
document are striking, such as the fact that the positions
stated in the document are almost identical to those ex-
pressed in the statements of biotech lobby groups (34, 35,
37) and seem to be in favor of strong patents on upstream
inventions. This suggests that, regardless of some exam-
ples of proactive involvement of the academic commu-
nity in attempts to restrain the encroachment of market
institutions on the sphere of science and enabling tech-
nologies, for the time being the academic community is
likely to stay faithful to its offspring, the biotech industry
and favorable of a tight IP regime on which this industry
depends.
A SLIGHTLY OR A PROFOUNDLY
DIFFERENT INSTITUTION OF SCIENCE?
The above analyzed developments, captured by the
different IP responses of public scientists to patents on
research tools, make one wonder whether today biomed-
ical researchers operate within an institution of science
that is markedly different from the one described by soci-
ologists of science a few decades a go (9). The adoption of
market practices in the system of public science has most
likely been facilitated by the complementarities between
the institution of science and the institution of IP. Both
institutions serve the public good by stimulating the pro-
duction and disclosure of knowledge and by coordinat-
ing the interactions between the producers of knowledge,
as well as between the producers and the users of knowl-
edge. They are both based on some kind of organized
system of certifying knowledge according to impersonal
criteria. By rewarding originality, i.e. novelty in research
contributions, they also set a race for priority among re-
searchers and inventors.
The above parallels, of course, do not preclude impor-
tant and potentially pervasive differences. To start with,
the reward structures of the two institutions – the mech-
anisms set up to encourage the advancement of knowl-
edge – differ profoundly. The reward system of science is
based on collegiate reputations, established through pri-
ority in publication of verifiable research findings. Once
researchers make a contribution and receive recognition
for it, their research findings become part of the public
domain. In science property rights become thus whittled
down to »the recognition by others of the scientist’s dis-
tinctive part in having brought the result into being« (9).
Recognition, to be sure, brings along prestige, better ca-
reer prospects and better chances for receiving research
grants and prizes. However, no matter how ground-
breaking their contributions are, after publishing them
scientists have no further control over how and by whom
their results are used.
Conversely, the institution of IP purports to stimulate
innovation by allowing inventors to reap monopoly prof-
its from their inventions for a limited period of time. Of
course, the inventor can choose to restrain from exercis-
ing these monopoly rights or to exercise them in a so-
cially responsible manner. Yet the possibility of monetiz-
ing research results remains. When this possibility is
transferred to the setting of public science, it can magnify
an already present potential dysfunction of the science
reward system – its sometimes »pathogenic« emphasis
upon originality which leads to secretiveness during the
early stages of inquiry, violent conflicts over priority and
premature publications designed to establish grounds for
later claims of having been first (9). In the context of this
tremendous institutional imperative towards originality,
the ownership of foundational patents becomes an at-
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tractive option not least because it can facilitate the pres-
ervation of lead positions in certain research lines by ac-
cruing research funds through licensing revenues and
industrial funding.
Why have scientists been able to accommodate market
elements in their institutional roles and yet remain by
and large loyal to the institution of science? A possible
explanation to this institutional resilience may be related
to the fact that institutions are highly multi-dimensional
entities, consisting of formal rules, informal norms and
culturally shaped, taken-for-granted assumptions about
reality. Each dimension has its own principles and practi-
ces and not all dimensions change simultaneously (38, 39).
External institutional elements such as patent regula-
tions and incentives were quickly adopted by the institu-
tion of science. So were some political ideas about the ef-
ficiency of markets for knowledge and the roles of the
public research sector in fostering innovation and na-
tional competitiveness. However, this process of transla-
tion was only partial because of two factors: the problem-
atic enforceability of patent regulations in the research
setting and the considerable discretionary role of scien-
tists and their representatives – due also to the relative
autonomy of science – in interpreting what research re-
sults should be patented, how patent licensing should be
handled and to what extent patents should be heeded
when performing research.
Therefore, in the day-by-day operation of the institu-
tion of science, where activities and interactions tend to
be determined more by informal norms than by spel-
led-out rules, it could be supposed that the process of
change proceeded mainly though a gradual recombina-
tion of existing institutional elements – in order to adapt
them to the new situation – and only to a minor extent
though the adoption of new elements. As a result of this
sometimes the openness requirements were made stri-
cter than in the past, as in the case of community re-
source projects requiring immediate publication of data.
In other instances, the norms of openness were bent in
the name of technology transfer and competitiveness.
Whether this process has gone too far, and the ideas that
sustain it – such as the assumptions about the necessity of
patenting for technology transfer and about the compati-
bility of patents and the goals of science –have become
too taken-for-granted, is not easy to say. Most of these
normative changes have been incremental, which may
imply that their effects on the dynamics of knowledge ad-
vancement could also be incremental.
Market pressures were not only accommodated by
some transformations within the system of science with
respect to knowledge disclosure practices. They also had
wider repercussions, affecting the larger institutional con-
stellation in which science is embedded. Apart from be-
ing used as mechanisms of technology transfer through
exclusive licensing to incumbent firms, as envisaged by
the Bayh-Dole Act, patents began to be viewed by uni-
versities also as instruments of accrual of funds through
non-exclusive licensing and industrial partnerships, as
well as an instrument for spin-off firm formation. For in-
stance, one in three biotech firms located in California
were founded by University of Califrnia scientists (5).
This brought PROs much closer to market organiza-
tions than the mere patenting for the purpose of exclu-
sive licensing to domestic firms would have. According
to Pisano (5), technology transfer in biotechnology has
mainly taken place through new firm formation rather
than through collaboration between academia and estab-
lished firms. In his view, this propensity to found spin-off
firms, together with a more general focus on monetizing
IP in academia, might have impeded flows of informa-
tion and curtailed the ability of incumbent firms to re-
spond to the requirements of risk management, integra-
tion and learning at the organizational level.
CONCLUSION
By and large the interviews and the other primary and
secondary data examined in this study indicate that the
institutional fusion of science and the market has so far
not created insurmountable problems. Currently aca-
demics seem to be able, at least to a certain extent, to get
the best of the two worlds: they can choose to ignore pat-
ents and rely on »open science« norms when they act as
users of patented inventions and play according to the
rules of the market when producing commercially inter-
esting research results. The general trend, however, seems
to be a growing acceptance or at least tolerance of market
mechanisms in the public sphere.
The presented overview of PROs’ IP responses to the
patenting of research tools in biomedicine shows that
there are also strategies that are critical towards the ap-
propriateness of market mechanisms for some type of sci-
entific information and enabling technologies. These re-
sponses indicate that the juggling between the worlds of
»open science« and proprietary technology is not always
smooth. The problems that these responses highlight are
of two types. Firstly, there are problems related to patents
per se, for instance problems of access to research tools be-
cause of privately held and aggressively enforced patents
on genes, cell lines and similar resources. The second
type of problem is the lack of integration and learning,
presumably because of growing secrecy and fragmenta-
tion of both public and private research efforts.
Gauging the effects of IP changes on the academic
culture of openness and sharing is methodologically chal-
lenging, not least because it involves estimating the coun-
terfactual – working out what would have been the level
of sharing and openness without the possibility of patent
protection (10). Academic involvement in patenting ac-
tivities has for sure had some self-reinforcing dynamics,
in the sense that it contributed to the institutionalization
of technology transfer offices endowed with missions of
providing licensing income to PROs, the forging of their
collaborations with IP prone patent attorneys, the streng-
thening of the ties between universities and biotech firms
and the growing popularity of practices whereby firms fi-
nance public research in exchange for exclusive IP rights.
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All this created a series of dependencies between PROs
and market institutions and organizations. It is prudent
to acknowledge that the increasing returns trait of insti-
tutions could create organizations with a stake in exist-
ing constraints, which would shape policy in their inter-
ests, even if the resulting equilibrium was sub-optimal
from the social welfare perspective (39). The resistance of
the US biomedical research sector to proposals to intro-
duce changes in the IP system might be an indication
that this is already taking place.
REFERENCES
1. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH 1998 Report of the Na-
tional Institutes of Health (NIH) Working Group on Research
Tools, Presented to the Advisory Committee to the Director on June
4, 1998. Available at www.nih.gov [accessed: 18.4.2006].
2. JAFFE A 2000 The US Patent System in Transition: Policy Innova-
tion and the Innovation Process. Res policy 29: 531–557
3. NELSON R 2004 The market economy and the scientific com-
mons. Res policy 33: 455–471
4. COCKBURN I 2003 O Brave New Industry, That Has Such Pat-
ents in It! Reflections on the Economic Consequences of Patenting
DNA. In: Scott Kieeff F (ed) Perspectives on the Properties of the
Human Genome Project. Elsevier Academic Press, p 385
5. PISANO G 2006 Science Business: The Promise, the Reality, and
the Future of Biotech. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, Mas-
sachusetts.
6. GITTER D 2001 International conflicts over patenting human DNA
sequences in the United States and the European Union: An argu-
ment for compulsory licensing and a fair-use exemption. New York
U Law Rev 76: 1623–1691
7. CORIAT B, ORSI F 2002 Establishing a new intellectual property
rights regime in the United States. Origins, content and problems.
Res policy 31: 1491–1507
8. HELLER M A, EISENBERG R S 1998 Can patents deter innova-
tion? The Anticommons in biomedical research. Science 280: 698–701
9. MERTON R 1973 The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Em-
pirical Investigations. University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
10. DAVID P 2003 The Economic Logic of 'Open Science' and the Bal-
ance between Private Property Rights and the Public Domain in Sci-
entific Data and Information: A Primer. SIEPR Discussion Paper
No. 02–30, Stanford University, Stanford.
11. DASGUPTA P, DAVID P 1994 Towards a new economics of sci-
ence. Res policy 23: 487–521
12. BLUMENTHAL D, CAMPBELL E G, ANDERSON M S, CAU-
SINO N, LOUIS K S 1997 Witholding reserach results in academic
life sciences: evidence from a national survey of faculty. J Am Med
Assoc 227(16): 1224–1228
13. THURSBY J G, THURSBY M C 2002 Who is selling to the ivory to-
wer? Sources of growth in university licensing. Manage Sci 48: 90–104
14. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL
ACADEMIES 2006 Reaping the Benefits of Genomic and Proteo-
mic Research: Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation, and Public
Health. Report prepared by the Committee on Intellectual Property
Rights in Genomic and Protein Research and Innovation, The Na-
tional Academies Press, Washington, DC.
15. TAYMOR K 2007 Interview with Ken Taymor, Attorney and Execu-
tive Director of the Berkeley Center for Law Business and Economy,
conducted by the author on 6th December 2007 in Berkeley, California.
16. PUBLIC PATENT FOUNDATION 2010 PUBPAT and ACLU
Argue Today That Patents On Breast Cancer Genes Are Unconstitu-
tional And Invalid: First Hearing In Federal Court About the Paten-
tability Of Human Genes. Available at: www.pubpat.org [accessed:
1.3.2010].
17. SCHWARTZ J 2009 Cancer Patients Challenge the Patenting of a
Gene. New York Times: May 13, 2009.
18. NATIONAL HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INSTITUTE
2008 ENCODE Project Data Release Policy. Available at www.ge-
nome.gov [accessed: 13.4.2008].
19. WELLCOME TRUST 2003 Sharing Data from Large Scale Biolo-
gical Projects: A System of Tripartite Responsibility. Report of a meet-
ing organized by the Wellcome Trust on 14–5 January 2003 at Ford
Lauderdale, US. Available at www.genome.gov [accessed: 8.4. 2007].
20. WALSH J P, COHEN W M, CHO C 2007 Where excludability
matters: Material versus intellectual property in academic biomedi-
cal research. Res policy 36 (8): 1184–1203
21. STREITZ W 2007 Interview with Wendy Streitz, Director of Policy,
Analysis and Campus Services in the University of California’s cen-
tral Office of Technology Transfer, conducted by the author on 17th
December 2007 in Oakland, California.
22. DE LA PUENTE V 2007 Interview with Virginia de la Puente, li-
censing specialist at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory,
conducted by the author on 1st October 2007 in Berkeley, California.
23. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH 1999 Principles and
Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts on
Obtaining and Disseminating Biomedical Research Resources: Fi-
nal Notice. Federal Register 64: 246
24. STANFORD UNIVERSITY 2006 In the Public Interest: Nine
Points to Consider in Licensing University Technology. White Paper
signed by twelve US universities and the Association of American
Medical Colleges (AAMC), document received during the visit to
the Stanford Office of Technology Licensing on the 5th October 2007
in Stanford.
25. TULLIUS T 2007 Interview with Tom Tullius, Professor of Pharma-
cology and Experimental Therapeutics, Boston University School of
Medicine, conducted by the author on 16th November 2007 in Bos-
ton, Massachusetts.
26. KIRSHBAUM J 2007 Interview with Joel Kirschbaum, Director of
the Office of Technology Management at the University of Califor-
nia at San Francisco conducted by the author on 31st October 2007 in
San Francisco, California.
27. MURRAY F, AGHION P, DEWATRAPONT M, KOLEV J, STERN
S 2008 Of Mice and Academics: The Role of Openness in Science.
MIT Sloan Working Paper.
28. WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION 2005 Genetics, genomics
and the patenting of DNA: Review of potential implications for
health in developing countries. Available at www.who.int [accessed:
4.6.2006].
29. PUBLIC PATENT FOUNDATION 2004 PUBPAT Scores An-
other Victory: Columbia University Abandons Assertion of Chal-
lenged Cotransformation Patent. Available at: www.pubpat.org [ac-
cessed: 2.6.2008].
30. SCOTCHMER 2004 Innovation and Incentives. MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts.
31. BENKLER Y 2004 Commons-based strategies and the problems of
patents. Science 305: 1110–1111
32. RAVICHER D 2008 Telephone interview with Daniel Ravicher, Ex-
ecutive Director of the Public Patent Foundation in New York City,
conducted by the author on 7th January 2008.
33. USPTO 2007 Notice of Preliminary Injunction of the Claims and
Continuations Final Rule, Rules and Clarifications Not Effective on
November 1, 2007. Available at: www.uspto.gov [accessed: 4.9.2008].
34. BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION 2007 The
Statement of The Biotechnology Industry Organization On H.R.
1908, The Patent Reform Act of 2007, The United States House of
Representatives, Committee on Judiciary, Subcommittee on Courts,
the Internet, and Intellectual Property, April 26, 2007. Biotechnology
Industry Organization, Washington DC.
35. BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION 2007 The
Statement of The Biotechnology Industry Organization On The
Role of Federally-Funded University Research in the Patent System
Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary. October 24, 2007, Bio-
technology Industry Organization, Washington DC.
36. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 2007 Patent reform legislation.
Analysis of S.1145, the »Patent Reform Act of 2007« – Provisions of
Concern to UC, University of California, Office of Federal Govern-
ment Relations, Washington, DC.
37. CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE INSTITUTE 2007 Impact of Pa-
tent Law Changes on Biomedical Investment and Innovation. Avail-
able at: www.chi.org [accessed: 6.1.2008].
38. CAMPBELL J 2006 What’s New? General Patterns of Planned
Macro-Institutional Change. In: Hage J, Meeus M (ed.) Innovation,
Science, and Institutional Change. A Research Handbook. Oxford
University Press, Oxford, p 50
39. NORTH D 1990 Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic
Performance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
390 Period biol, Vol 112, No 4, 2010.
Tamara Jonji} Juggling Between Open Science and the Market
